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As part of the grant offer, stakeholder end-users in low- income or ultra- poverty regions are encouraged 
to contribute 5% of the total hand-pump asset cost in a form of labour or household financing, as set by 
IMF/ World Bank who is the main project investor. This model also outlines that stakeholder end-users 
take up the maintenance role when the project sponsors leave the scene, yet there are challenges to 
successfully maintain the assets. This study attempts to identify end-users efforts and challenges in hand-
pump project maintenance and propose a strategy to overcome the gap. Data collection was done using 
12 Convergence Interviews, 36 Individual Case Interviews and two sets of Focus Groups in operational 
as well as non-operational hand-pumps in rural Malawi. Results show that end-users financing is 
inadequate to cover maintenance of a major hand-pump breakdown and/or overhaul. To address the gap, 
a risk management plan in form of micro insurance maintenance subsidy is proposed as part of the 
project design. 
 
Introduction 
Hand-pump- maintenance is done within the framework of donor aid and local government policies (UNDP, 
2006). Donor or foreign aid in this context is external financial aid, which could be in monetary or non-
monetary terms. The significant donor in hand-pumps' projects just like most development projects is 
IMF/World Bank through UNDP (UNDP, 2006) which dedicated $23 billion towards the funding of hand-
pump projects(World Bank, 2008). Policies, therefore, originate from IMF/ World Bank (World Bank, 
2008) as they invest the financial resources through mainly NGOs. Donor aid funding investment is the key 
to summon end-user requirements or contribution in hand-pump maintenance. Traditionally, IMF/ World 
Bank foreign aid for rural projects had no conditions attached to it until the 1990s. Since then there have 
been debates on foreign aid effectiveness and economic growth of recipient countries hence aid policy 
reform for most developing countries, since the work of Collier & Dollar (2001). Collier & Dollar (2001) 
propose effective donor aid in a form of decentralised pool funding and end-user contributions. The 
requirement is that end-users contribute to hand-pump financing in a form of cost sharing (UNDP, 2006). 
End-user contribution is often a requirement that funders attach to their grants offers. The concept of end–
user contribution is to reduce donor dependency and ‘install'’ the concept of self-help, ownership, and 
empowerment other than passive recipients. Whilst NGOs role is to cater for the total cost of the assets and 
project administrations, stakeholder end-users are urged to contribute 5-10% of the total cost of an asset in a 
form of upfront hand-pump maintenance cash, materials like sand, bricks, gravel and free labour for digging 
the wells (UNDP, 2006). Whittington (2002) concurs that poor rural end-users are willing to pay, but 
politicians discourage payment to gain votes. Schouten & Moriarty (2003) argue that willingness to pay 
may differ from the ability to pay as poor users may not have the ability to pay. End-user financial 
contribution aimed at fund-raising for on-going management of water assets is practiced in some 
developing countries such as India (Prokopy, 2009); Tanzania, (Gine & Prez Foguet, 2008); Swaziland, 
(Graciana, 2010). According to Prokopy, (2009), End-user fees and participation had a positive impact on 
drinking water projects in India. However, Breetz & Fisher-Vanden, (2007) argue that cost sharing can 
discourage end-users if payments are not fairly and transparently done. According to Harvey, (2007) 
demanding that rural end-users donate to project financing is ‘tyranny’. Morally, marginalised end-user 
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human rights is to be upheld just like any other human being. Human rights is about the welfare one 
deserves for virtual of being a human being. Article 8 and 12 of the Human Rights Act state the roles 
within the government or authorities to provide for their citizens. It is therefore, the authorities’ 
responsibility to devise ways how basic needs of the inhabitants are met. Although article 8 and 12 
advocate protection of the marginalised groups; governments in developing countries often depend on 
donor aid (UNDP, 2006). 
Donor aid presents in different forms among which is micro insurance. Micro- insurance, is about the 
subsidy provision by the donor agent, often through the project sponsor, so the poor can access the services. 
The aim of external aid provision for loans and/or saving schemes is to break the poverty vicious cycle. 
Though the main aim was improved financial outcome, Hamid, Roberts & Mosley, (2011) postulates that 
there have also been benefits associated with improved general health and non-financial outcomes for the 
poor. Jutting (2004) observed that those in the financial micro credit for their health scheme were better off 
than the non-members. Dekker & Wilms (2010) highlights that rural dwellers in micro care insurance 
borrowed less, which eventually reduced the overall government health expenditure. However, Schneider 
(2005) noted that trust between the members and quality of insured services was a challenge. Therefore, the 
imposition of tariffs so that hand-pump water is not treated as a free commodity as proposed within the 
donor aid policies may be difficult to comply by some end-users in some low-income or ultra-poverty 
regions in developing countries. Whether end-users comply to donor aid requirements for hand-pump- 
maintenance remains unclear. Furthermore, questions arise as to whether the local stakeholders are able to 
fund the hand-pump maintenance effectively, which this research clarifies using a case study in rural areas 
of Malawi so as to get a detailed picture and answer the research questions:  
‘To what extent do end-user contributions address hand-pump maintenance in rural areas of Malawi; 
what are the limitations of their efforts and what strategy can fill the gap?’? 
 
The choice of case study representative sampling 
The study chosen hand-pumps were from a large pool of over thousands of hand-pumps in Malawi, 
therefore, the working and non-working hand-pumps were samples. The study was investigating the process 
of managing hand-pump challenges, to make sense of the social phenomena. Multiple sites were more 
appealing than a single hand-pump site as can make claims about a large population of hand-pumps, 
settings, maintenance events, processes than a single site. So nine hand-pump sites were chosen from two 
different Traditional Authorities (TAs) of the two districts out of 24 districts in Malawi (NSO, 2010), 
divided into Traditional Authorities (TAs) and wards (sub-TAs or group village heads). Each TA comprises 
of villages; the smallest administrative units presided by the village headman or chief. Selections of the two 
districts were systematically sampled (Saunders et al, 2009) because they had NGOs, which had 
implemented hand-pump projects among which included Concern Universal, World Vision, OXFAM, EU 
and Inter AID in TA Bvumbwe, Thyolo District and TA Mazengela or (Nkhoma area) in Lilongwe District. 
Systematic sampling was also used for the selection of villages based on whether had operational or non-
operational hand-pumps. Four operational hand-pumps in the villages of Khuwi, Chadza, Kachepa and 
Mavule with one non-operational hand-pump in Kamjeda were randomly chosen in Nkhoma. In Bvumbwe, 
Gute, Bulaki, Mphenzu was sampled as operational village-hand pumps, including Kapsyepsye, which had a 
non-operational hand-pump. While the researcher chose the districts and the TAs, choice of the villages and 
the nine hand-pumps was guided by the local extension workers and/or the chiefs or gate keepers. As the 
research had to concentrate on those who were familiar with the hand-pump projects so the gate keepers 
used snow-ball sampling. In this, the respondents sampled and interviewed, directed the researcher to 
another respondent (Yin, 2009).  
Choices of actors alternatively called respondents or interviewees were based on whether they:  
 Used the hand-pump or had knowledge about hand-pump developments 
 Were village representatives with roles on the hand- pump 
 Were water point committees members or local hand-pump repairers  
Phases of interviews were in three categories namely: Convergence Interviews (CIs), Individual Case 
Interviews (ICIs) and Focus Groups (FGs). CI approach was used to funnel analysis of general categories as 
it started with open-ended questions. Answers were probed to help determine what they considered as 
negative issues of the hand-pump- maintenance. Each category had a specific definition to clarify the 
concept as proposed by the respondents in CI process. ICIs were the second session and used semi-
structured interviews. Questions were developed based on the categories developed in convergence 
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interviews. The respondents were asked to score or rank the factors retarding hand-pump maintenance: 
whether they perceived the factor had influence or not, and if it did to what degree or influence did it affect 
their hand-pump operations and maintenance? The respondents were given the opportunity to add to the 
factors or simply make comments. Each response was tallied on each scale of the questions in terms of the 
level the factor had in prohibiting maintenance of the hand-pump. A summary of comments on each 
question as to why that scale or level of influence was chosen was written underneath. ICIs used Likert-type 
scales to measure the level or extent of the maintenance challenge factor in terms of the influence on the 
hand-pump maintenance. The scales attached a value to each influence on the hand-pump maintenance 
problems to aid comparison. Categories of maintenance identified in CI, ICI were further confirmed in 
Focus Groups (FGs). Focus Group Discussions were used as a third step to confirm categories developed in 
CI, and cross checked in ICIs. One member started, and others followed the snowball contributions also 
called ‘synergy group effect’. FGs involved those who draw water from the same hand-pump throughout, as 
these had similar relationships. Hence discussions in FGs became group themes other than individual. The 
researcher moderated FGs, on a group of ten respondent end-users, one from a maintained hand-pump and 
the other from a non-operational hand-pump.  
The FGs were analysed using content analysis. Content analysis involved identifying, coding and 
categorising the primary patterns. Chunk of data was organised into topics and files and were given a name 
and a label (Robson, 2011). Grouping involved identifying key words in the contexts. Transcription was 
done using listening, categorising and summarising data. The key words with similar meaning were grouped 
together into piles of similar meaning. Summarizing data also involved identifying key points emerging and 
compressing (condensing) long statements to brief statements in which the main sense of what was said 
could be rephrased in a few words. The researcher also looked for missing words related to maintenance 
challenges as identified in literature. Missing words indicated that the respondents may not have been 
familiar with the hand-pump maintenance challenge factor, or if it did not happen at all in the process of 
their hand-pump maintenance. After this process, the researcher then returned the transcribed description to 
the respondent end-users for validation of findings. The presentation of data followed thematic coding of the 
data analysis; for theme emphasis, clarity and easy understanding, some exact words stated by respondents 
were included.  
 
Findings  
Four main problems were identified by respondents both Convergence Interviews and Individual Case 
Interviews. Lack of capacity to repair major faults had the highest ranking. Respondents commented that 
hand-pump local mechanics could repair most faults in hand-pumps, but the Afridev hand-pump cylinder 
which he could not do as it required special equipment to dismantle. In Nkhoma, the pump technician 
reported he was also unable to repair the cylinder because it required dismantling the part which he could 
attempt to do if he had the equipment to do so. This section, therefore, confirms that hand-pump major hand-
pump maintenance and/or rehabilitation (replacement of the whole asset) still rely on external aid or project 
sponsors at present in both Nkhoma and Bvumbwe. 
Inadequate local fund as their chief challenge was ranked as the primary challenge. End-users identified 
this as a challenge because as much as most people were keen to contribute, most end-users were financially 
constrained, often hit by draughts as much as subsistence farming is the main source of their livelihood and 
economic security. End-users were encountered with financial problems to raise funds for hand-pump 
maintenance, because some spare parts had cost them more than £ 120. Such expensive parts took rural end-
users from 3 to 4 villages an average of 4 to 6 months to contribute. In Gute village, respondents EU 10 and 
31 stated they had to get a loan from a local farmer to pay for the hand-pump expenses and eventually pay 
back the debt over a period of one year. This section shows that though end-users are proactive in making 
household contributions, funds are inadequate to meet major hand-pump refurbishment, which required 
dearer spare parts. 
Spare parts as a challenge: One of the challenges respondents scored was the issue of spare parts. Spare 
parts problem was reported as the third mode because respondents still faced some problems to find spares. 
Obtaining spare parts for Afridev (deep wells) was considerably more difficult than obtaining for MALDA 
hand-pumps (shallow wells). This is because MALDA hand-pumps were manufactured locally whilst the 
Afridev were imported from abroad. Respondents preferred to have Afridev pumps than MALDA hand-
pumps because they were more reliable and yielded more water in wet and dry seasons. This section shows 
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that although end-users preferred Afridev hand-pumps, but spare parts were either more expensive or not 
readily accessed for maintenance purposes.  
Challenge of hand-pump vandalism: The least ranked challenge was vandalism. Hand-pump vandalism 
was also a concern as some few hand-pumps particularly MALDA hand-pumps were easy to vandalise. 
Vandalised hand-pumps incurred more maintenance demands as often major parts were rooted out. Some 
villages like Mavule and Gute took strict measures to counteract this malpractice by installing a rock or 
employing a watchman from the village to guard the hand-pump at night. This suggests that though end-
users had maintained hand-pumps, some few individuals had ill intentions. 
 
Focus group thoughts about the problems of hand-pump maintenance 
Respondents were asked about challenges related to spare parts, whether they had actual experiences of the 
hand-pump challenges, how they sorted the challenges and what they thought could be done in the future to 
avoid such problems. Most discussion showed that end users were concerned if a major hand-pump fault 
occurred as they may not be in a position to meet the maintenance requirements. Khuwi respondents agreed 
that they had experienced a problem of major spare part fault on their hand-pump, installed by Interaid 
NGO, which they failed to repair until when World Vision, another NGO came on board to repair it. 
Respondents echoed, ‘we need external help if it is a big hand-pump problem beyond our scope’ (EU 57 
Khuwi) . In Kapsyepsye 1 village a water committee member had a different opinion and said: 
‘European Union (EU)constructed the bore hole in 2002. Concern Universal assisted to repair while they 
were in project phase in 2006 …then it broke down again …by then Concern Universal had phased out we 
could not repair it ….though we had made contribution of K4200 (£16)’ (EU 63,65 &68) 
This situation was also seen in Kamjeda village hand-pump. Household contributions were generously 
done for Kamjeda village hand-pump yet the hand-pump was abandoned. The reason for failure to maintain 
it was because a maintenance expense to replace the asset was beyond their ability, mostly because of the 
underlying poverty situation.  
 
Conclusion 
 End-users are incapacitated to do major hand-pump maintenance 
 IMF/World Bank policy of cost sharing limited to minor maintenance  
 
NGO projects sponsors, which included Interaid, OXFAM, and Concern Universal were the main 
investors for capital equipment of the hand-pumps in Nkhoma and Bvumbwe, but serious maintenance flaws 
occurred when these NGOs phased out. This implies that NGOs or project sponsors spend more capital costs 
to install the hand-pumps than the return on investment. Value for money is reduced because some hand-
pumps do not last long and lacks a system to sustain them when they require refurbishment or repair of a 
major breakdown. 
 
 Lessons learnt 
 End- users are resourceful, keen to maintain hand-pumps despite poverty and this is seen by their 
initiative to establish maintenance bank accounts although the accounts had inadequate money 
 
As much as IMF/World Bank provides guidelines for stakeholder End-User financing for hand-pump 
maintenance, the guidelines are inadequate to cater for major maintenance. There is need for the project 
sponsor intervention in assisting for upfront plans for major maintenance and/or refurbishment. Project 
sponsors can, therefore, further scale–up the end-user initiative with a micro insurance subsidy as part of the 
risk planning for major maintenance costs. The requirement of 5% financial/labour in put as proposed by the 
donors is practicable when stakeholder end-users are mobilized to manage the hand-pump assets. 
 
Contribution to policy and practice: micro insurance subsidy 
This study contributes to the clarity of debates, whether the poor and marginalised end-users should 
solemnly shoulder the financing of the hand-pump maintenance. As the study, main outcome is failed major 
maintenance due to financial constraints, the study, therefore, recommends that new and existing hand-
pumps have a subsidy, for anticipating major breakdown, in a form of a micro insurance scheme. Each 
hand-pump micro-insurance scheme to be equivalent to about one-third of the total hand-pump asset and to 
be part of the project design. To reduce the costs for the funders, project sponsors may consider a concept of 
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‘doing less for the better.’ In this model the number of hand-pumps constructed may be reduced to cater for 
the extra one–third major maintenance subsidy. This concept is about building fewer hand-pumps with the 
purpose of increasing the asset productive life span. For example, instead of constructing 100 pumps, the 
NGO would fully fund for 66 and summon the extra third as a risk plan for major maintenance or 
rehabilitation subsidy. This could increase the number of hand-pumps working by 10-20% in Malawi as 66 
hand-pumps would give a higher asset productive life cycle-years than 100 when 35% end-up with major 
breakdown and deemed non- functional (WHO/UNICEF, 2009; NSO, 2010). This recommendation is about 
small changes that could end up with lasting impact thus improving a failure rate from the current 30% to 
about 15% at no extra cost. NGOs or project sponsors could also provide money for the micro insurance in a 
form of credit provision to cater for maintenance activities. Donor's subsidy is required because NGOs phase 
out hence not considered a viable financial strategy. So a new financing strategy would be required in the 
form of credit provision to improve affordability of expensive parts. This approach shifts from relying upon 
the presence of NGOs for maintenance to credit provision. So the study recommends financial support from 
the project sponsor in the form of a micro insurance linked to a revolving fund through the local banks, 
which are savings and credit cooperations as such allow banking conditions for rural community groups. 
Therefore, this study recommends that the project sponsors do not construct hand-pumps unless each pump 
has been assigned an extra third of the grant for major maintenance subsidy.  
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